*Result*: Integration strategies for a reverse supply chain with horizontal competitive recycling.
*Further Information*
*In this study, we investigate a dual-recycling reverse supply chain comprising a manufacturer, a collector, and a recycling company. The collector operates exclusively through an offline recycling channel, whereas the recycling company adopts a hybrid strategy that combines online and offline channels. Five game models are constructed to represent different recycling scenarios. Profit distribution within cooperative settings is analysed using the Shapley value and average tree value methods. The results show that cooperation between the manufacturer and collector generally yields a higher joint profit than that between the manufacturer and recycling company. A coalition between the collector and recycling company increases their joint profit but reduces the manufacturer's profit relative to the non-cooperative case. Full cooperation among all three parties consistently maximises the total profit of the reverse supply chain. Both allocation methods ensure effective profit sharing: the Shapley value provides the greatest benefit to the collector, whereas the average tree value favours the manufacturer and recycling company. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
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